Fair Intergenerational Sharing of a Natural Resource by Ambec, Stefan & D'Albis, Hippolyte
  09-084 
Research Group: Environmental Economics and Natural Resources September 17, 2009 
Fair Intergenerational Sharing of a 
Natural Resource 
 
HIPPOLYTE D’ALBIS AND STEFAN AMBEC 
 
Fair intergenerational sharing of a natural resource
Hippolyte d’Albis and Stefan Ambec∗
September 17, 2009
Abstract
In this article, overlapping generations are extracting a natural resource over an
infinite future. We examine the fair allocation of resource and compensations among
generations. Fairness is defined by core lower bounds and aspiration upper bounds.
The core lower bounds require that every coalition of generations obtains at least what
it could achieve by itself. The aspiration upper bounds require that no coalition of
generations enjoys a higher welfare than it would achieve if nobody else extracted the
resource. We show that, upon existence, the allocation that satisfies the two fairness cri-
teria is unique and assigns to each generation its marginal contribution to the preceding
generation. Finally, we describe the dynamics of such an allocation.
1 Introduction
Sustainable development is defined by the Brundtland Report as “development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs”. In an economy with natural resources, this definition of sustainable development
may require that present generations abstain from extracting any resources. Indeed, as long
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as a resource is scarce in the precise sense that every generation cannot meet its own resource
needs, meeting the needs of present generations would compromise the ability of future gener-
ations to meet their own needs. Therefore, natural resource scarcity implies that sustainable
development as defined above is impossible.
One way to reconcile the above definition of sustainable development with scarce natural
resource is to consider the welfare equivalent of resource needs. Indeed, meeting future gen-
eration’s needs requires that the present generations reduce their extraction and, therefore,
consume less than their needs, which in turn reduces their welfare. Yet they might enjoy as
much welfare as if they were to consume the amount necessary to meet their needs if future
generations transfer part of their welfare derived from resource extraction. The welfare of
present generations who do not extract too much of a resource is then preserved through
compensations from future generations. However, the compensation made by future genera-
tions to present ones should not be too high, since otherwise, it would compromise their own
welfare.
We examine fair paths of extraction and compensations in a natural resource economy
by considering two fairness criteria. The first criterion is the so-called core lower bound.
It requires that the welfare of any generation or group of generations not be lower than
what it could achieve by itself. The theoretical background of this criterion is a fictitious
negotiation in which all generations are able to meet, agree on an extraction path and carry out
compensations among themselves. We impose the condition that any generation or coalition
of generations should obtain at least what it would get as a result of this negotiation.
The second fairness criterion hinges on a solidarity principle and is named the aspiration
upper bound. It requires that no generation or group of generations enjoys a welfare higher
than its aspiration welfare, i.e. the welfare it would achieve if no other generation were to
extract the resource. The scarcity of the resource is here important since, by definition, not
all generations can achieve their aspiration welfare. The aspiration upper bound thus features
some intergenerational solidarity.
We show that, upon existence, a unique extraction path and vector of compensations
satisfy the two fairness criteria. Each generation is assigned a welfare that is equal to its
marginal contribution to the preceding generation. We also describe the dynamics of the
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fair extraction path and the compensations. Notably, compensations are shown to increase
over time for at least the first generations, which brings into question their feasibility: some
generations might not be able to produce enough goods from the resource stock to pay previous
generations back. As a consequence, fair allocation might not exist. We provide examples
where it does exist and others where it does not. Finally, we show that if there is no technical
progress on resource productivity, the welfare of generations decreases over time.
Our paper combines two streams of literature that deal with the management of natural
resources in a normative way. On the one hand, axiomatic theory of justice has recently
been applied by Bossert et al. (2007), Roemer and Suzumura (2007) and Asheim (2007)
in order to compare welfare among generations. On the other hand, dynamic programming
methods have been used to solve the social planner’s problem, featuring a representative
infinitely-lived individual maximizing the sum of a discounted flow of utilities. Pioneer works
have been proposed by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974) for exhaustible resources
and these have been extended in many directions. Among them, most notably, is the use of
the vintage structure of the population by Marini and Scaramozzino (1995). By combining
these two approaches, our fairness axioms thus depend not only on preferences but also on
technological constraints and on the resource dynamics. From these axioms, we are then in a
position to analyze the fairness properties of extraction paths and intergenerational sharing
of welfare.
It should be noted that, in the literature, most of the axioms defining intergenerational
fairness treat generations symmetrically. They consider generations behind a “veil of igno-
rance” with regard to their position on the time scale, which implies that earlier generations
should not be favored over later generations and vice versa. Here, in contrast, the two fair-
ness principles treat generations asymmetrically and acknowledge the priority access of the
earlier generations to the natural resource. We believe that the sequence of extraction and
the dynamics of the resource are two important features of the problem. They characterize
the rights and duties of generations in the intergenerational sharing of a natural resource.
Concerning the rights, the laissez-faire extraction outcome defines legitimate rights on the re-
source which, when translated into welfare, lead to the core lower bounds. These rights are de
facto resource endowments in an intergenerational exchange economy. By agreeing to reduce
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their resource extraction when young in exchange for a compensation when old, a generation
trades part of its resource endowment against consumption. The core lower bounds restrict
the allocation of a resource and consumption within the core of this particular exchange econ-
omy. In the tradition of the general equilibrium theory, being in the core can be viewed as an
attractive fairness principle: a coalition of generations would object to an allocation that is
not in the core by arguing that it can achieve a higher welfare by sharing its own endowment
among its members. The duties of present generations toward future ones is defined by the
solidarity principle. By upper bounding welfare, earlier generations are forbidden from taking
advantage of their priority on the resource by getting too much welfare from the trading with
future generations.1 In a nutshell, the core lower bounds favor earlier generations while the
aspiration upper bounds protect later ones.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model while Sections 3 and 4
define the fairness principles. In Section 5, we characterize the fair allocation of resources and
compensations. We describe its dynamics and discuss its existence in Section 6. Conclusions
are given in Section 7.
2 Model
A natural resource is exploited by successive overlapping generations indexed by their birth
date t ∈ N+. Let k0 be the initial stock of resource and ρ its regeneration rate with ρ ≥ 1
(the case ρ = 1 corresponds to an exhaustible resource). Let xt denote the amount of the
resource extracted at date t. The dynamics of the resource stock is given by the following law
of motion:
kt+1 = ρ(kt − xt) (1)
Each generation t lives through two periods, youth and old age. It exploits the resource
when young as an input to produce consumption units through a production function ft. We
1They might easily end up with more than their aspiration welfare when trading the resource against
consumption in competitive markets. In a resource-sharing problem (with an exhaustible resource and a finite
number of agents) with a concave and single peak preference similar to that of the present paper, Ambec
(2008) shows that the Walrasian allocation with equal division of the resource violates the aspiration upper
bounds.
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assume that ft is strictly concave and increasing up to a maximal production level ft (xˆt) and
then decreasing. Formally f 0t(xt) > 0 for all xt < xˆt, f 0t(xˆt) = 0, f 0t(xt) < 0 for all xt > xˆt,
and f 00t (xt) < 0.2 The extraction level xˆt is called generation t’s optimal extraction. We
also assume that ft(0) = 0 and f 0t(0) = +∞ for all t. Coexisting generations might perform
transfers among themselves. A generation t might share its production when young with old
people from the preceding generation. Let mt denote the consumption units transferred by
the generation t when young to the generation t− 1 when old. Thus, generation t consumes
ft(xt)−mt when young and mt+1 when old. Without loss of generality m0, which denotes the
first transfer made by the generation 0 to the generation born in −1 is normalized to zero,
since the welfare of generation −1 is not considered here. Let γt be the individual discount
rate, i.e. the value in terms of the intertemporal utility at time t of a marginal increase in the
instantaneous utility at time t+ 1. We assume that 0 < γt < 1. Generation t’s consumption
from resource exploitation, hereafter referred to as “utility”, viewed at date t with xt units
extracted and transfers mt and mt+1, is:
ut = ft(xt)−mt + γtmt+1. (2)
We assume that the resource is scarce in the sense that all generations cannot extract enough
to meet their demands xˆt. More precisely, there exists t˜ ∈ N++ such that if all generations
t < t˜ extract xˆt, the resource available for generation t˜ is strictly lower than generation t˜’s
optimal extraction xˆt˜. Formally, ∃t˜ such that ρt˜k0 −
Pt˜−1
t=0 ρ
t˜−txˆt < xˆt˜.
In this set-up with a scarce resource and transferable utility, the selfish outcome under
autarky is inefficient (Pareto-dominated) as the following argument shows. Under autarky,
it is optimal for each generation t to extract the resource up to xˆt. They therefore enjoy
ft(xˆt) consumption units or utility at time t. Generation t˜ extracts the remaining resource
ρt˜k0−
Pt˜−1
t=0 ρ
t˜−txˆt, thereby exhausting the resource and leaving nothing for future generations,
who therefore obtain ft(0) for all t > t˜. Given that ft is concave with f 0t(0) = +∞, total
production from resource extraction up to a date later than t˜ can be increased if at least one
generation l before t˜ reduces its extraction to leave some of the resource for future generations
2Negative returns above xˆt can be due to production costs that exceed the benefits from resource extraction,
e.g. bottleneck effects on complementary inputs (e.g. labor or capital) that render the resource unproductive
but nonetheless costly to extract.
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after t˜. The increased production can be shared among generations through transfers mt so
that every generation becomes better off at least weakly, and strongly for some of them.
We examine coordinated extractions and transfers among generations. Generations agree
on an allocation {xt,mt}t=0,...,+∞ that assigns resource extraction levels and intergenerational
transfers for every generation t. The allocation {xt,mt} must satisfy the following feasibility
conditions for all t ∈ N+:
0 ≤ xt ≤ kt, (3)
0 ≤ mt ≤ ft(xt). (4)
The first feasibility condition (3) ensures that the (non-negative) amount of resource extracted
does not exceed the stock available at date t. The second feasibility condition (4) ensures that
the (non-negative) transfer to the old of the previous generation is lower than the consumption
goods produced at date t.
3 Core lower bounds
Our first fairness criterion refers to a fictitious cooperative game. Suppose that all generations
can meet to agree on an allocation. A core allocation of the fictitious cooperative game is
such that any coalition of generations obtains at least what it could obtain on its own, i.e. by
coordinating extraction and carrying out transfers among its members. It satisfies the core
lower bound, defined as the highest welfare that a coalition can achieve on its own, for any
arbitrary coalition.
In the fictitious cooperative game, generations can share the benefit from resource ex-
traction without constraints: transfers can be carried out among generations that are not
contemporaneous in reality. More importantly, non-contemporaneous generations might ben-
efit from coordinated extraction and share this benefit through transfers. In cooperative game
theory terms, non-consecutive coalitions can create value. Of course, in the fictitious cooper-
ative game, the sequence of extraction remains fixed: generations cannot exchange the timing
of their extraction.
A coalition of generations is a non-empty subset of N+. Given two coalitions S and T ,
we write S < T if i < j for all i ∈ S and all j ∈ T . Given a coalition S, the first and the
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last generation in S are denoted by minS and maxS respectively. Let Pi = {1, . . . , i} denote
the set of predecessors of generation i, and P 0i = Pi\{i} the set of strict predecessors of
generation i. Similarly, let Fi = {i, i + 1, . . . , n} denote the set of followers of generation i,
and F 0i = Fi\{i} the set of strict followers of generation i. We often omit set brackets for
sets and write i instead of {i}, or v(i, j) instead of v({i, j}). A coalition S is consecutive (or
connected) if for all i, j ∈ S and all k ∈ N , i < k < j implies k ∈ S.
We need to define the highest welfare that a coalition can achieve on its own in the fictitious
cooperative game. This is a cooperative game with externalities: the welfare of a coalition
S depends on extraction strategy by generations outside of S through the stock of resource
available to S. We assume that the outsiders behave non-cooperatively by extracting the
resource under autarky. Consider a coalition S. Without loss of generality, let us assign a
weight θt to agent t ∈ S. The welfare of S is
P
t∈S
θtut. It means that 1 unit of utility transferred
by generation t to generation t + j is valuated at θt+j/θt units. The value of θt is obviously
an important issue and, in the rest of this paper, we assume that relative weights equal the
generation’s discount factor, i.e. θt/θt−1 = γt−1. Let us now explain our choice. First, replace
the utility of each generation belonging to the coalition in the welfare function to obtain:X
t∈S
θt [ft (xt)−mt + γtmt+1] . (5)
If the coalition embodies consecutive generations, S = {minS, ...,maxS}, equation (5) can
be rewritten (up to a constant) as follows:X
t∈S
θt
θminS
ft (xt)−mminS +
X
t∈S
θt
θminS
∙
γt −
θt+1
θt
¸
mt+1 +
θmaxS
θminS
γmaxSmmaxS+1. (6)
Hence, it is only when θt/θt−1 = γt−1 that a transfer involving two coexisting generations (i.e.
a young individual born at time t and an old one born at time t − 1) is neutral for welfare.
If θt/θt−1 > γt−1, a transfer from a young individual to an old one has a negative impact on
welfare. Transfers are thus likely to be set to zero. Similarly, if θt/θt−1 < γt−1, the transfer
increases the coalition’s welfare. It should then be maximal. When the generations within the
coalition are not consecutive, the situation is even worse since the condition θt/θt−1 = γt−1
is the only way to make the intergenerational transfer neutral for those who do not belong
to the coalition. We thus argue that the welfare of a coalition should discount the utility (or
consumption) of future generations because each individual discounts time in her or his own
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utility function. For utility (or consumption) to be transferable without efficiency gain or loss,
we need to discount it when we compute the welfare of a coalition.3 Under this assumption
of neutral transfers, the welfare of coalition S as defined in (5) becomes:X
t∈S
Πti=1γi−1ft (xt) . (7)
For expositional convenience and without loss of generality, we assume from now on that all
generations discount utility at the same rate, γt = γ, which simplifies coalition S’s welfare as
defined in (7) to
P
t∈S γ
tft (xt).4
Let v(S) be the value function that assigns the highest welfare to any arbitrary coalition
S. Consider a coalition of consecutive generations S = {minS, ...,maxS}. The welfare that
S can achieve depends on the stock of resource available for the first generation minS. We
consider the worst possible credible5 scenario for S, one in which generations preceding the
coalition have extracted up to their their optimal level xˆ whenever possible. Therefore, the
stock of resource, denoted kncSminS, available for the first generation minS of a coalition S is:
kncSminS ≡ min{ρminSk0 −
minS−1X
t=0
ρminS−txˆt, 0}.
Let xS = (xi)i∈S be the resource allocation assigned to members of S. The welfare v(S)
valued at date 0 that the consecutive coalition S can achieve on its own is:
v(S) = max
xS
X
t∈S
γtft(xt),
s.t.
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
kt+1 = ρ (kt − xt) ,
kt ≥ xt ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0,
kminS = kncSminS.
(8)
3A consistent explanation for both individual and social discounting relies on the possibility, at each period
of time, of the end of the world (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974 and 1979). The discount rate is then the world’s
survival probability and, provided that the utility is zero in the case of a collapse, objectives (2) and (5) can
be seen as expected utility functions. Equalizing the individual and coalition discount rates would, in this
case, be reasonable.
4This assumption is not needed for the proof of Proposition 1, which therefore holds for heterogenous
discount rates.
5Extracting more than xˆt is not credible for a generation t since it reduces production and therefore utility.
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The constraints on the maximization program are the resource dynamics, the feasibility and
the initial resource stock conditions respectively. In particular, for singletons S = {i}, we
have
v(i) = fi(min{xˆi, knci }).
For any arbitrary coalition S, let C(S) = {Tl}Ll=1, where T1 < T2 < ... < TL denotes the set of
connected components of S, i.e. C(S) is the coarsest partition of S such that any Tl ∈ C(S)
is connected. Since the generations between two consecutive sub-coalitions Tl−1, Tl ∈ C(S)
extract up to their optimal level xˆ, given the resource stock kmaxTl left by the last generation
in Tl, the resource stock available for Tl for l = 2, ..., L is
kncSminTl ≡ min
⎧
⎨
⎩ρ
(minTl−maxTl−1+1)kmaxTl−1+1 −
minTl−1X
t=maxTl−1+1
ρ(minTl−t)xˆt, 0
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
The welfare v(S) valued at date 0 that S can achieve on its own is thus:
v(S) = max
xS
X
t∈S
γtft(xt),
s.t.
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
kt+1 = ρ (kt − xt) ,
kt ≥ xt ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0,
kminTl = k
ncS
minTl for l = 1, ..., L
(9)
In contrast to the case of consecutive coalitions, the initial resource stock constraints are
defined for each consecutive component of S. Let xSS denote the solution to (9) for any
coalition S.
An important property of the value function defined in (9) is its superadditivity. Consider
any disjoint coalitions T, S ⊂ N+. Since the resource allocation (xTT , xSS) can be implemented
by coalition T ∪ S, we have:
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
An allocation {xt,mt} satisfies the core lower bounds if and only if for all coalitions S ⊂ N+X
t∈S
γt (ft(xt)−mt + γmt+1) ≥ v(S). (10)
9
4 Aspiration upper bounds
Our second criterion is based on a solidarity principle inspired by Moulin (1990). In the
absence of other generations, a generation t would be endowed with ρtk0 units of the resource,
which is the “natural” stock. It could enjoy the benefit of extracting this resource stock up
to its optimal level xˆt. Let us call this benefit valued at date 0 the generation t’s aspiration
welfare, and let it be denoted by W (t) = γtft(min{ρtk0, xˆt}). Since the resource is scarce
in the precise sense that ρtk0 −
Pt−1
j=0 ρ
j−txˆj < xˆt for all t ≥ t˜, it is impossible for every
generation to be assigned its aspiration welfare.6 In Moulin (1990)’s terms, the sustainable
resource exploitation problem exhibits negative group externalities. Because no particular
generation bears any distinct responsibility for these externalities, it is only natural to ask
for every generation to accept a share of it: no generation should end up above its aspiration
welfare. This argument can be generalized to coalitions in a very natural way. The aspiration
welfare of an arbitrary coalition S is the highest welfare it could achieve in the absence of
other generations.7
In contrast to the core lower bounds v(S), coalition S inherits from an untouched resource
when the aspiration welfare is computed. Formally, coalition S has access to ρminSk0 > kncSminS.
For connected coalitions, it is the solution to the following program:
w(S) = max
xS
X
t∈S
γtft(xt),
s.t.
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
kt+1 = ρ (kt − xt) ,
kt ≥ xt ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0,
kminS = ρminSk0.
(11)
The constraints in the maximization program are the resource dynamics, the feasibility and
the initial resource stock respectively.
A disconnected coalition S that leaves some resource stock after the last generation in Tl
to supply the generations in Tl+1 experiences no extraction from outsiders. Therefore, the
6Indeed, for any t > t˜ (where t˜ is defined above) and consecutive coalitions t ∈ S, we have
P
t∈S w(t) >
v(S), that is, the sum of the generations’ aspiration welfare exceeds the maximal welfare from resource
exploitation.
7Similar to the case of the core lower bounds, we allow for transfers among non-contemporaneous genera-
tions in S.
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resource stock entering Tl+1 is ρ(minTl+1−maxTl)kmaxTl . The aspiration welfare of an arbitrary
coalition S is thus:
w(S) = max
xS
X
t∈S
γtft(xt),
s.t.
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
kt+1 = ρ (kt − xt) ,
kt ≥ xt ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0,
kminTl = ρ
(minTl+1−maxTl)kmaxTl for l = 1, ..., L.
(12)
The constraints in the maximization program are the resource dynamics, the feasibility and
the initial resource stock conditions respectively. The main difference between programs (9)
and (12) lies in the initial resource stocks that are reduced by generations outside of S in (9)
but not in (12).
An allocation {xt,mt} satisfies the aspiration upper bounds if and only if, for all coalitions
S ⊂ N+X
t∈S
γt (ft(xt)−mt + γmt+1) ≤ w(S). (13)
5 A unique fair allocation
Consider the efficient resource allocation {x∗t} solution to the maximization program defined
by v(N+). Formally, {x∗t} maximizes
P∞
t=0 γ
tft(xt) subject to the initial resource stock con-
straint k0, the resource dynamics constraint kt+1 = ρ(kt − xt) and the feasibility constraints
kt ≥ xt ≥ 0 for t = 0, 1, 2, .... The concavity of ft ensures that {x∗t} is unique.
A transfer scheme {mt} defines a distribution of the welfare from intergenerational resource
extraction. We focus on the transfer scheme that leads to the downstream welfare distribution
introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Denoted by {m∗t}, it is the unique transfer scheme
in which each generation is assigned its marginal contribution to the preceding generation.
Formally, {x∗t ,m∗t} assigns u∗t = ft(x∗t )−m∗t + γm∗t+1 to every generation t ∈ N+ with:
γtu∗t = v(Pt)− v(P 0t).
Proposition 1 If m∗t ≤ ft(x∗t ) for all t ∈ N+, {x∗t ,m∗t} is the unique allocation that satisfies
the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds.
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Proof
First, we prove that if an allocation {xt} satisfies the core lower bounds {xt} = {x∗t}. The
core lower bounds imply that:
jX
t=0
γt(ft(xt)−mt + γmt+1) ≥ v(Pj),
for all j ∈ N+. Since
Pj
t=0 γ
t(ft(xt)−mt+ γmt+1), the above inequality for j −→∞ leads to
∞X
t=0
γtft(xt) + lim
j−→∞
γj+1mj+1 ≥ v(N+). (14)
Since γ < 1 then limj−→∞ γj+1 = 0 and, since the feasibility constraint (4) upper bounds
mj+1, limj−→∞ γj+1mj+1 = 0. Therefore (14) implies
∞X
t=0
γtft(xt) ≥ v(N+),
which, when combined with the definition of v(N+), implies that {xt} = {x∗t}.
Second, it is easy to see that if a welfare distribution {mt} satisfies both the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds, then {mt} = {m∗t}. This is due to the fact that
for coalitions starting from 0 up to any generation t, we have v(Pt) = w(Pt).8 Given m0,
since v(0) = w(0), we must have m1 = m∗1. Let mt = m∗t for all t ≤ j + 1. The core
constraints and the aspiration upper bounds force
Pj
t=0 γ
t(ft(x∗t ) − mt + γmt+1) = v(Pj),
hence γj(fj(x∗j)−mj+γmj+1) = v(Pj)−
Pj−1
t=0 γ
t(ft(x∗t )−mt+γmt+1). Thus bymt = m∗t for
all t ≤ j + 1, then
Pj−1
t=0 γ
t(ft(x∗t )−mt + γmt+1) =
Pj−1
t=0 γ
t(ft(x∗t )−m∗t + γm∗t+1) = v(P 0j),
we therefore obtain γj(fj(x∗j)−mj + γmj+1) = v(Pj)− v(P 0j), i.e. the desired conclusion.
Next, we show that {x∗t ,m∗t} satisfies the core lower bounds, that is,
P
t∈S γ
tu∗t ≥ v(S) for
any coalition S where u∗t ≡ ft(x∗t )−m∗t + γm∗t+1.
Before we proceed, we note the following: for all t, we have v(P 0t) + γtft(xˆt) ≥ v(Pt).
Thus for all generations t,
γtft(xˆt) ≥ v(Pt)− v(P 0t). (15)
8Note that the uniqueness of our solution is due the equality of the core lower bounds and aspiration
welfare upper bounds for all consecutive coalitions starting from 0, i.e. v(Pt) = w(Pt) for all t. Notably, if
we bound the size of coalitions that might be formed to say n ¿ +∞, other transfer schemes might satisfy
the two fairness axioms. More precisely, mt can differ from m∗t for generations t > n.
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Suppose first of all that S is a consecutive coalition. Since PS = P 0S ∪ S, by superad-
ditivity of v, v(PS) ≥ v(P 0S) + v(S) and
P
t∈S γ
tu∗t = v(PS)− v(P 0S), which implies thatP
t∈S γ
tu∗t ≥ v(S).
Second, consider any coalition S. Take the last generation in S that obtains some resource
l(S) = maxt{t ∈ S : xSt > 0}. If l(S) does not exist then v(S) = 0 ≤
P
t∈S γ
tu∗t . Let
S¯ = Pl(S)\P 0minS be the coalition of all generations from minS to l(S). Since S¯ is
connected,
P
t∈S¯ γ
tu∗t = v(PS¯) − v(P 0S¯) ≥ v(S¯). Adding
P
t∈S¯\S γ
tu∗t to both sides of the
last inequality yields:X
t∈S
γtu∗t ≥ v(S¯)−
X
t∈S¯\S
γtu∗t . (16)
Since generations between connected coalitions in S up to l(S) extract up to their optimal
level, the allocation (xSS∩Pl(S), xˆS\S¯) can be implemented in S¯, which implies
v(S¯) ≥ v(S ∩ Pl(S)) +
X
t∈S¯\S
ft(xˆt). (17)
Since there is no more resource to be shared in S after l(S), ft(xSt ) = ft(0) = 0 for any
t ∈ S\Pl(S), which therefore implies that v(S) = v(S ∩ Pl(S)). We combine (16) and (17)
to obtainX
t∈S
γtu∗t ≥ v(S) +
X
t∈S¯\S
γt (ft(xˆt)− u∗t )
From (15), we know that γtft(xˆt) ≥ γtu∗t for all t. Hence,
P
t∈S γ
tu∗t ≥ v(S), which shows
that {m∗t} satisfies the core lower bounds.
Lastly, we show that {x∗t ,m∗t} satisfies the aspiration upper bounds. The proof uses the
following lemma that is proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If S ⊆ T ⊆ N and T < i, then w(S ∪ i)− w(S) ≥ w(T ∪ i)− w(T ).
Then for any coalition S, we obtainX
i∈S
γtu∗i =
X
i∈S
(w(Pi)− w(P 0i)) ≤
X
i∈S
(w(Pi ∩ S)− w(P 0i ∩ S)) = w(S),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the latter equality follows from the fact that
all terms, except w(P maxS ∩ S) = w(S) and −w(P 0minS ∩ S) = w(∅) = 0,cancel out. ¤
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6 Description of fair allocation
Let us now describe the unique allocation, denoted by {x∗t ,m∗t}, which satisfies the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds. To proceed, we need some additional assumptions on
the time dependency of the production function. We will notably focus on the time-invariant
case such that ft (x) = ft+1 (x), which can be interpreted as the case with no technical
progress. We will then provide some intuitions on how the fair allocation is modified when
some specific technical progress is introduced.
Proposition 1 states that the fair path of extraction {x∗t} is an efficient one. It can
therefore be studied independently of the fair path of transfers {m∗t}. In the specific case
where ft (x) = ft+1 (x), which implies that xˆt = xˆt+1, {x∗t} is the solution of the following
problem:
max
{xt}
∞X
t=0
γtf (xt) ,
s.t.
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
kt+1 = ρ (kt − xt) ,
xt ≥ 0, kt ≥ 0,
k0 > 0 given.
(18)
The following Proposition characterizes the solution to problem (18).
Proposition 2 If ft (x) = f (x) for all t, the fair path of extraction {x∗t} and the stock of
resource are:
i) monotonically increasing if γρ > 1 with an asymptotic constant extraction path x∗∞ = xˆ
and k∞ =
ρ
ρ− 1 xˆ,
ii) monotonically decreasing if γρ < 1 with a stock that is asymptotically exhausted,
iii) constant for all t if γρ = 1 with a constant extraction path x∗t =
³
1− 1ρ
´
k0 for all t.
Proof
To begin, let us observe that an xt is optimal if and only if it belongs to [0, xˆ]. Suppose
by contradiction that x˜t is optimal and is such that x˜t > xˆ. Then, there exists ε > 0 such
that f ((1− ε) x˜t) > f (x˜t) and ρ (kt − (1− ε)xt) > ρ (kt − x˜t). Hence x˜t is not optimal.
14
The first order condition of problem (18) is:
f 0 (xt−1)− γρf 0 (xt) = 0, (19)
for all t ∈ N++, while the transversality condition is:
lim
t→+∞
γtf 0 (xt) kt+1 = 0. (20)
Hence {x∗t} solves (19), the resource constraint and (20). Since xt ≥ xt−1 ⇔ f 0 (xt) ≤ f 0 (xt−1),
we use (19) to conclude that: x∗t ≥ x∗t−1 ⇔ γρ ≥ 1. Thus, there are three distinct cases
depending on the value of γρ.
Case 1: γρ > 1. The optimal trajectory x∗t converge to xˆ. It remains to determine x∗0. There
are three families of candidates that are represented in the following phase diagram (see Figure
1).
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"
"
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Figure 1
The first family of candidates is such that kt converges to 0. After a while, this convergence
is monotonic. With equation kt+1 = ρ (kt − xt) , this implies that xt converges to 0, which
is a contradiction. These trajectories are not optimal. The second family of candidates is
such that kt converge to +∞. These trajectories do not satisfy the transversality condition.
Indeed, on the optimal path, one has:
γtf 0 (xt) kt+1
γt−1f 0 (xt−1) kt
=
kt+1
ρkt
= 1− xt
kt
,
where the first equality comes from (19) and the second from the resource constraint. There-
fore,
lim
t→+∞
γtf 0 (xt) kt+1
γt−1f 0 (xt−1) kt
= 1 and lim
t→+∞
γtf 0 (xt) kt+1 → +∞.
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The third candidate is the saddle point solution for which kt converges to ρρ−1 xˆ. This solution
satisfies the transversality condition. Along the trajectory, the resource stock is monotonically
increasing.
Case 2: γρ < 1. Because of the condition limx→0 f 0 (x) = +∞, the optimal trajectory
x∗t converges to 0. To determine x∗0, one should study two families of candidates that are
represented in the following phase diagram (see Figure 2).
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The first family of candidates is such that kt converges to 0. Among them, only one is such
that x∗t converges to 0, while the others exhibit a sequence of xt that converges to positive
values, which is thus impossible. It remains for us to check that the good trajectory satisfies
the transversality condition. On the optimal path, since kt converge to 0, one has:
γtf 0 (xt) kt+1
γt−1f 0 (xt−1) kt
=
kt+1
ρkt
<
1
ρ
< 1,
from which we deduce that: limt→+∞ γtf 0 (xt) kt+1 = 0. Along this path, the stock of the
resource decreases monotonically and is asymptotically exhausted.
The second family of candidates is such that kt converges to +∞. As in Case 1, these
trajectories do not satisfy the transversality condition.
Case 3: γρ = 1. In this particular case, any constant solution solves (19). Let x∗ be the
optimal solution. Given the objective: maxxt
∞P
t=0
γtf (xt), the closer x∗ is to xˆ, the better. To
compute x∗, we rewrite the resources dynamics such that:
kt+1 = ρt+1
∙
k0 − x∗
1− γt+1
1− γ
¸
,
and substitute this expression into (20) to obtain: limt→+∞ f 0 (x∗) ρ [k0 − x∗/ (1− γ)] = 0.
The optimal solution is thus: x∗ = (1− γ) k0 if (1− γ) k0 < xˆ, and x∗ = xˆ otherwise. The
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latter solution is eliminated on the assumption of resource scarcity. In the former, the stock
of resource is constant. ¤
We note that these results can be immediately extended to specific technical progress. Let
us suppose for instance that: ft (xt) = Atf (xt) = A0ηtf (.) with 1 ≤ η < 1/γ. The problem
can now be written as: maxxt
∞P
t=0
(γη)t f (xt) , subject to the same constraint. The problem is
thus the same as (18), apart from the fact that we now compare γη with ρ.
Another way to introduce technical progress would be to suppose that ft (xt) = f (Atxt)
with At = A0ηt and η ≥ 1. The first order condition (19) should then be replaced by:
f 0 (At−1xt−1)− γρηf 0 (Atxt) = 0. Defining: x˘t = Atxt and k˘t = Atkt, the optimal solution can
thus be found by solving:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
k˘t+1 − ρη
³
k˘t − x˘t
´
= 0
f 0 (x˘t−1)− γρηf 0 (x˘t) = 0
which is the same as the one studied previously, provided that ρ is replaced by ρη.
Let us now turn to the characterization of the fair path of transfers {m∗t}. From Proposi-
tion 1, we have:
m∗t+1 =
tP
i=0
γifi
¡
xPti
¢
−
tP
i=0
γifi (x∗i )
γt+1
, (21)
for all t ∈ N+, and where xPti is the solution to maxxi
tP
i=0
γifi (xi) subject to the resource and
non-negativity constraints. As it has been discussed above, limt→+∞ xPti = x
∗
i . Hence, by the
definition of the maximum, m∗t+1 ≥ 0. However, we have seen that fair allocation exists if and
only if m∗t+1 ≤ ft+1
¡
x∗t+1
¢
for all t ∈ N+. We would like to stress that this condition is very
restrictive and is not satisfied in many cases. Indeed, fair transfers are likely to increase over
time: each generation has to compensate the previous one for not exploiting the resource in
an autarkic way and also for having compensated the previous generation. Hence, as shown
in the following Lemma, fair transfers increase, at least for an initial interval of time.
Proposition 3 Fair transfers satisfy: m∗t+2 ≥ m∗t+1, for all t ≤ t˜− 2,
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Proof
Using (21), m∗t+2 ≥ m∗t+1 if and only if:
tX
i=0
γi
h
fi
³
xPt+1i
´
− γfi
¡
xPti
¢i
+ γt+1ft+1
³
xPt+1t+1
´
≥ (1− γ)
tX
i=0
γifi (x∗i )+ γ
t+1ft+1
¡
x∗t+1
¢
We recall that t˜ relies on the scarcity of the resource and gives the date at which the resource
is depleted under autarky. Hence, for all t ≤ t˜− 2, the resource is abundant and the optimal
exploitation is kept at the generations’ optimal extraction: i.e. xPt+1i = xˆi. The previous
inequality can hence be rewritten as:
(1− γ)
tX
i=0
γifi (xˆi) + γt+1ft+1 (xˆt+1) ≥ (1− γ)
tX
i=0
γifi (x∗i ) + γ
t+1ft+1
¡
x∗t+1
¢
,
which, given that xˆt ≥ x∗t for all t from Proposition 2, is obviously satisfied. ¤
Let us illustrate the existence problem driven by the increase of transfers over time by
a simple numerical application. Using Proposition 2, a specific case can indeed be easily
derived. Suppose that γρ = 1, and that ft (xt) =
√
xt for xt ≤ xˆ, where the value of xˆ is
sufficiently high (e.g. xˆ = k0).9 Thus, xPti = (1− γ) k0/ (1− γt+1) for all i, and:
m∗t+1 =
q
k0
(1−γ)
³p
1− γt+1 − (1− γt+1)
´
γt+1
,
which can be shown to be an increasing function of time. Moreover, since x∗i = (1− γ) k0 for all
i, the feasibility condition m∗t+1 ≤ ft+1
¡
x∗t+1
¢
is rewritten as:
p
1− γt+1 ≤ (1− γt+2), which
is always satisfied for low enough γ and never satisfied for large enough γ. For instance, m∗t+1
and ft+1
¡
x∗t+1
¢
are plotted as (continuous) functions of time in the figures below for various
values of γ. The increasing dashed blue curve represents m∗t+1 while the solid red line is the
constant ft+1
¡
x∗t+1
¢
. We see that the condition is satisfied for γ = 0.3 and γ = 0.5, while it
is not for γ = 0.7. To interpret this, let us recall that a larger γ implies (in this very specific
9More precisely, we need xˆt > x∗i = (1− γ) k0.
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case) a lower resource regeneration rate.
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It is worth mentioning that for γ = 0.7, the feasibility condition is violated “from the be-
ginning”, that is, for the first transfer m1 between the first two generations 1 and 2. More
precisely, along the efficient extraction path, the second generation has not enough production
to transfer to the first generation to make it as well off as it would be under autarky. Indeed,
in this example, it is impossible to find a compensation scheme that satisfies the core lower
bounds for coalitions composed by two successive generations only. Therefore, relaxing the
core lower bounds by allowing coalitions of limited size to form does not guarantee existence.
To conclude this characterization of fair allocation let us discuss the dynamics of the
utilities of each generation u∗t . The following Proposition gives a sufficient condition under
which the utilities decrease over time.
Proposition 4 For all t ≥ 2, u∗t ≤ u∗1 if ft
¡
xPtt
¢
≤ f1 (xˆ1).
Proof
The Proof of Proposition 1 implies that u∗1 = f1 (xˆ1). As a consequence, u∗t ≤ u∗1 ⇔
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γm∗t+1 −mt ≤ f1 (xˆ1)− ft (x∗t ) , which using (21) implies that u∗t ≤ u∗1 if and only if:
t−1X
i=0
γifi
¡
xPti
¢
−
t−1X
i=0
γifi
³
xPt−1i
´
≤ γt
£
f1 (xˆ1)− ft
¡
xPtt
¢¤
.
Using the definition of a maximum, we observe that the left-hand side of the inequality is
negative, which is sufficient for us to conclude. ¤
A direct implication of this is that technical progress is a necessary condition for fair
allocation to keep the utilities at least constant. Indeed, if ft (x) = ft+1 (x) , then the maximal
production level decided by the first generation cannot be overcome.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a fair allocation of a scarce resource over an infinite sequence
of overlapping generations. When it satisfies two fairness criteria, namely the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds, the allocation is unique. The exploitation of the
resource is efficient and there is no generation left without any resource. First generations are
compensated through a transfer scheme in which each generation is assigned its marginal
contribution to the preceding generation. Such a scheme is likely to induce an increase
in transfers over time that may cause the infeasibility of the allocation. Finally, technical
progress is necessary for avoiding the decrease of the utilities of future generations. One
remaining issue is the stability of the fair allocation, which is related to our last result. If
utilities decrease over time while the resource stock increases, future generations have an
incentive to deviate. This important question has been left for future research.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
This proof is adapted from Ambec and Ehlers (2008). Let ySS denote the solution of the
program defined by w(S) in (12) for any arbitrary coalition S ⊂ N+. As a first step in the
proof of this lemma, let us show that if ∅ 6= S ⊂ T ⊂ N, then ySS ≥ yTS . Clearly, it suffices
to establish that ySS ≥ yS∪tS whenever ∅ 6= S 6= N and t ∈ N\S. Let us write ySS = xS
and yS∪tS = yS. All agents under consideration in the argument belong to S. From the
definition of x and y,
P
i∈S yi ≤
P
i∈S xi. Let i1 ≤ ... ≤ iL be those i such that xi 6= yi (if
none exists, there is nothing to prove). We claim that yi1 < xi1. Suppose, by contradiction,
that the opposite (necessarily strict) inequality is true. Let j be the smallest successor of i1
such that yj < xj (which necessarily exists). Moreover, yj < xˆj since xj ≤ xˆj. We define
yεi1 = yi1−ε, yεj = yj+ρj−i1ε, yεi = yi for i 6= i1, j. Since f 0j(yj) > f 0j(xj) and f 0i1(xi1) > f 0i1(yi1),
choosing ε > 0 that is small enough (in particular such that yj + ρj−i1 < xˆj ) ensures
that
P
i∈S γ
ifi(yεi ) >
P
i∈S γ
ifi(yi) while yεS meets the same constraints as yS, which is a
contradiction. Since yi1 −xi1 < 0, it now follows that yil −xil < 0 successively for l = 2, ..., L.
Moving on to the second step, let S ⊂ T ⊂ N and T < i. We define x0i = yT∪ii and
x0j = yT∪ij + ySj − yTj for j ∈ S. From our first step, yT∪ij ≤ yTj ≤ ySj for all j ∈ S. Therefore
0 ≤ yT∪ij ≤ x0j ≤ ySj for all j ∈ S and the consumption plan x0 for S ∪ i satisfies the same
constraints as yS∪iS∪i. Hence, w(S ∪ i) ≥
P
j∈S∪i γ
jfj(x0j) and
w(S ∪ i)− w(S) ≥ γifi(x0i) +
X
j∈S
γj[fj(x0j)− fj(ySj )]. (22)
On the other hand, since yT∪ij ≤ yTj for all j ∈ T\S,
w(T ∪ i)− w(T ) ≤ γifi(x0i) +
X
j∈S
γj[fj(yT∪ij )− fj(yTj )]. (23)
Since x0j − ySj = yT∪ij − yTj and yT∪ij ≤ x0j for all j ∈ S, it follows from (22), (23), and the
concavity on the rising portion of fj, that w(T ∪ i)−w(T ) ≤ w(S∪ i)−w(S). This completes
the proof of the lemma. ¤
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